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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Was the issue raised by appellant preserved at trial 
for appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. As a general rule, [Utah] appellate 
courts will not consider an issue . . . raised for the first time 
on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case 
involves exceptional circumstances. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
359 (Utah App. 1993). 
II. Has the appellant met her burden of marshaling all 
the evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The defendant " ' ' must marshal all 
evidence supporting the . . . verdict and must then show how this 
marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.' ' " State 
v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 1992) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). 
III. Is proof of intent to obtain sexual gratification or 
stimulation a necessary element of the offense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Where a claim is asserted without 
argument in an appellant's brief, the appellate court may refuse 
to consider the claim. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah 
App. 1992) . 
IV. If the phrase "in an act of apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification" is not an element of intentf 
was the evidence sufficient to satisfy that phrase as an 
element of physical conduct under the ordinance? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Appellate review of claims of 
insufficiency of the evidence based on a bench trial apply the 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Featherstone, 781 P.2d 
424, 431-32 (Utah 1989). 
2 
V. If the phrase is an element of intent, was the 
evidence sufficient to meet the "apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification" element of the ordinance 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Appellate review of claims of 
insufficiency of the evidence based on a bench trial apply the 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Featherstone, 781 P. 2d 
424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), the 
plaintiff and appellee will not present an independent Statement 
of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the evening hours of April 29, 1993, Officer Kent Bigelow 
and Detective Arslanian of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
were assigned to vice and were working in the areas of State 
Street and North Temple, areas known to be heavily worked by 
prostitutes. R. 66-67. 
Officer Bigelow and Detective Arslanian observed a female 
known to them as having prior prostitution bookings get into a 
silver vehicle at Harvard (approximately 1100 South) and State 
Street. R. 67. That female was the defendant, Diane Fritz 
("defendant"). R. 67. The officers attempted to follow the silver 
vehicle containing the defendant, in an attempt to catch her in 
the act of prostitution. R.67, 69. The officers were unable to do 
so. R. 67. The officers returned to State Street, and Detective 
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Arslanian notified Officer Bigelow that he had seen her get out of 
the car in the vicinity of 1200 South State Street. R. 67. 
Officer Bigelow was in an unmarked police vehicle, wearing 
civilian clothes. R.70. He pulled up to the defendant, stopped 
his vehicle next to her on State Street, and asked the defendant 
if she was dating. R.68. The defendant opened the car door 
herself, entered the car, and then said that yes, she was dating. 
R. 68, 72. She then asked if he was a cop. R. 68, 72. Officer 
Bigelow responded that he was not. R. 68. 
At this point the defendant told the officer to show her his 
"stuff". R. 68. In response, the officer took out some money. R. 
68. The defendant's response was "No, what's between your legs." 
R. 68. The officer in turn asked her how he was supposed to know 
if she was a cop. R. 68. The defendant's response was to raise 
her blouse and bra up and cupped her breast with one hand. R. 68. 
She said "Let's do it together." R. 68. Thus, the defendant was 
offering to expose her breast to the officer if he would expose 
himself to her. R.71. The officer fiddled with his zipper. R.68. 
He did not undo his zipper but pretended that he was ready to 
expose himself. R.71. The defendant said "Now" and neither she 
nor the officer moved. R. 68. 
The defendant then reached over with her free hand and groped 
the officer's crotch. R. 68. She said to the officer "Well, 
you're not even unzipped yet." R.68. The officer realized that no 
offer and agreement for sex would be forthcoming and arrested the 
defendant at that point for disorderly conduct based on her 
groping. R. 68. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The issue now presented by the defendant was not 
preserved at trial below for appellate review. The Court of 
Appeals should therefore not address the issue raised by defendant 
and uphold her conviction. 
II. The defendant has not satisfied the marshalling 
requirement. The defendant has not presented all the evidence 
nor shown in a light favorable to the verdict how that evidence 
supports the verdict. Without proper marshalling of the evidence, 
the defendant's appeal should not be considered by the Court of 
Appeals and the defendant's conviction affirmed. 
III. "Intent to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification" 
is not an element of the offense. The defendant asserts without 
analysis or support that the phrase "apparent sexual stimulation 
or gratification" is an element of intent. Where an issue is not 
fully briefed, the Court of Appeals may and should disregard the 
argument and affirm the decision below. The phrase "an act of 
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" refers to conduct 
having the appearance of sexual stimulation or gratification. 
That phrase does not refer to the state of mind of the defendant. 
IV. Since "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is 
not an element of intent, the evidence was sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt "apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification" as a substantive element of the ordinance. 
V. If, in the alternative, the Court of Appeals were to hold 
the phrase was an element of intent, the evidence was sufficient 
to prove "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" as an 
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i n t e n t e l e m e n t of t h e o r d i n a n c e , w h e r e i n t e n t i s p r o p e r l y 
a n a l y z e d . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The issue was not preserved below for appellate review. 
At trial, the defendant did not preserve the specific issue 
now facing the Court of Appeals. As a result the Court of Appeals 
should not now consider the issue. "Utah courts require specific 
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial 
court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting VanDvke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distrib., Inc., 
758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988)). 
The defendant failed to specifically argue at trial that the 
intent element of the crime was not satisfied. Therefore the 
defendant failed to direct the trial court to the specific issue 
with sufficient clarity so that the trial court would be given the 
first opportunity to address the issue now ostensibly before the 
appellate court - that the intent element had not been satisfied, 
rather than the substantive conduct element. "This specificity 
requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess 
allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in 
the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue. For 
this reason, a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a 
specific substantive issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
at 361. 
6 
The trial court was never made aware at trial that the 
defendant was asserting that the intent element of the offense had 
not been satisfied. "The 'mere mention' of an issue without 
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does 
not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 
361. Indeed, the trial transcript reveals no suggestion that a 
motion to dismiss was made at the conclusion of the prosecution's 
case in chief. R. 72-73. 
The trial court addressed the issue of what constitutes 
sexual conduct in its ruling. R. 83-84. However, nowhere did the 
defendant specifically raise the current issue regarding the 
phrase "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification". "In sum, ' 
1[f]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it 
must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial judge can consider it.' * " State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361. 
The trial court was not given the opportunity to address whether 
the phrase "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" modified 
the intent element of the ordinance. Irrespective of whether the 
phrase is considered an element of intent, the defendant did not 
challenge at trial that the specific portion of the ordinance now 
asserted on appeal was not proven. The trial court was not given 
the opportunity to address the issue of how this now disputed 
phrase should be interpreted in light of the evidence presented. 
As a general rule, appellate courts will 
not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first 
time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances. The purpose of 
requiring a properly presented objection is to 
"put[] the judge on notice of the asserted 
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error and allow [] the opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding." The trial court is considered 
"the proper forum in which to commence 
thoughtful and probing analysis" of issues. 
Failing to argue an issue and present 
pertinent evidence in that forum denies the 
trial court "the opportunity to make any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law" 
pertinent to the claimed error. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 359-60 (citations omitted). 
A review of the trial transcript reveals no reference to a 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecution's case in 
chief nor at the conclusion of all the evidence. Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 17 (o) provides: "At the conclusion of the 
evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the 
evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense 
charged therein or any lesser included offense." The remarks made 
by defendant's counsel during closing argument were not specific 
enough to direct the trial court's attention to argument now 
raised on appeal. R. 79-81. Based on the defendant's failure to 
preserve at trial the issue she now frames on appeal, the City 
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals not consider that 
issue and affirm her conviction. 
POINT II, 
The defendant has not satisfied the marshaling 
requirement• 
The trial judge looked at all the evidence under "the 
circumstances of the whole." R. 84. That evidence included the 
following facts not set forth by the defendant. The defendant was 
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known to the police officers to have prior bookings for 
prostitution. R. 67. The area where the defendant was observed 
and arrested was known to the officers to be "heavily worked by 
prostitutes". R. 66. The police officer was attempting to catch 
the defendant in the act of soliciting or offering sex for hire. 
R. 69. The "common street verbal saying", rather than simply 
"saying are [you] a prostitute", is to say "are you dating". R. 
72. The trial judge, sitting as finder of fact, ruled that he was 
accepting the officer's testimony as to which version of events 
took place. R. 82-83. The trial judge further indicated a finding 
that the defendant was there "on business" and that " [i]f the 
officer had exposed himself as [the defendant] requested [the 
defendant] would have gone further and the actual sexual act would 
have been consumated." R. 83. 
The defendant cites State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378,381 (Utah 
App. 1992) for the following proposition: "When raising the issue 
of insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant is required to 
marshal all the evidence in favor of the verdict." Appellant's 
Brief at 6. State v. Lemons further states: 
To determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, "we 
view the evidence and the r eas onable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." We reverse only 
when the evidence, so viewed, " 'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.' " 
In challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the burden on the defendant is 
heavy. Defendant " 'must marshal all evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and must then 
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show how this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.• " 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added) . 
The evidence referred to above, omitted by the defendant from 
her brief, is important to the marshaling of the evidence because 
that forms an important part of the context in which the offense 
was committed. The context of alleged prostitution activity forms 
a key component of the factual background for the charge of 
disorderly conduct. The officer's testimony, accepted by the 
trial court, supports the reasonable inference that the conduct 
described by the officer constituted a preliminary negotiation for 
a sexual act.- the purpose of which would have been for the sexual 
stimulation or gratification of the "John" had he not been in fact 
an undercover police officer. Both the evidence itself and the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence are an 
important part of the appellate analysis. When all the evidence is 
taken into consideration and viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, the evidence here is neither "sufficiently 
inconclusive" nor "inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt". Based on the 
defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the City respectfully 
requests that the Court of Appeals decline the defendant's 
invitation to address the issue. 
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POINT III, 
Intent to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification is 
not an element of the offense. 
The defendant was charged with the offense of Disorderly 
Conduct, a violation of Salt Lake City ordinance § 11-16-100. The 
elements associated with this charge are to "willfully . . . 
engage in sexual conduct, alone or with another person". The term 
"willfully" is the intent or mental state element required for the 
offense (mens rea) . "Sexual conduct" is the physical aspect of 
the offense (actus reus). The definition of "sexual conduct" 
includes "any touching of the covered or uncovered genitals, [or] 
human female breast . . .whether alone or between members of the 
same or opposite sex . . in an act of apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification". Salt Lake City Code § 11-16-010(P), 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(7) (1953 as amended). The defendant 
concedes that her action of groping the officer's crotch is 
included in the definition of sexual conduct (Appellant's Brief at 
4) . The defendant centers her argument on the claim that (1) 
proof of intent to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification is a 
required element of the offense (Appellant's Brief at 4), (2) 
there was insufficient evidence to prove the groping was done with 
the intent of obtaining sexual gratification (Appellant's Brief at 
4), and (3) if not an element of intent, that it is an element 
that must be proven and distinguished from non-sexual touching of 
covered genitals (Appellant's Brief at 5). 
The defendant asserts without analysis, that the phrase "in 
an act of apparent sexual gratification" is an element of intent. 
1 1 
This is a mischaracterization of the element of "apparent sexual 
gratification". This assertion and mischaracterization is done 
without argument or analysis as to why this phrase should be 
considered an element of intent. This is a failure to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(9): "The argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
(Emphasis added.) Where a claim is asserted without argument, the 
Court of Appeals is under no obligation to provide the analysis 
for the defendant, and may refuse to consider the claim. See State 
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992). In Price, the Court of 
Appeals held that the defendant had not complied with Rule 24: "We 
agree with the State that defendant has not complied with Rule 24. 
. . . . Defendant failed to develop his claim either before the 
trial court or in his appellate brief." State v. Price, 827 P.2d 
at 249 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals continued: 
Defendant's brief on appeal does not 
support defendant's contentions with citations 
to the record and is devoid of legal analysis 
on the issue . . . . Utah's appellate courts 
have voiced their frustration with briefs 
which fail to comply with Rule 24. 
We have routinely refused to consider 
arguments which do not include a statement of 
the facts properly supported by citations to 
the record. 
Utah courts have also declined to reach 
the merits of an issue on appeal due to 
inadequate legal analysis. In State v. Day, 
815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991), the defendant 
.neglected "to establish any of these 
arguments in the record or by legal 
authority." Id. at 1351. We determined that 
this failure rendered the defendant's argument 
and analysis meaningless. Therefore, we 
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refused "to address this issue and assume[d] 
the correctness of the trial court's 
judgment." Id. 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d at 249 (footnotes omitted). 
The defendant states simply that the phrase "in an act of 
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is an element of 
intent. No argument is made for the proposition, and no authority 
is cited in favor of it. The plaintiff would request that the 
Court of Appeals refuse "to address the issue and assume the 
correctness of the trial court's judgment" as it did in State v. 
Price. 
As set forth in Point I above, the defendant denied the trial 
court the first opportunity to address the specific issue she now 
raises on appeal. The trial court addressed the nature of the 
conduct committed by the defendant, not whether the requisite 
intent for the offense required the defendant to have had a mind 
set bent on obtaining sexual stimulation or gratification for 
herself. As set forth in Point I above, the City would request 
the Court of Appeals not further consider the defendant's appeal 
for this reason. 
Should the Court proceed to consider the issue, the City 
provides this "in the alternative" analysis. The element of 
"apparent sexual gratification" does not address the mental state 
of the defendant. The mental state required by the ordinance is 
"willfully". Salt Lake City Code § 11-16-100. Proof of a culpable 
mental state is a requirement of Utah law where strict liability 
is not explicitly imposed. Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-2-101,-102,-103 
(1953 as amended) . "Willfully" is synonymous with the terms 
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"intentionally" or "with intent". "A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1953 as amended). 
The phrase the defendant claims modifies this element of 
intent is "in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification" . There is no suggestion in the phrase that it 
refers back to the mental state of the defendant. 
The term "apparent" is not a defined term in either the Salt 
Lake City Code or the Utah Code for the purpose here. Standard 
dictionary definitions of the term "apparent" are consistent. 
From the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 62 
(1969): "1. Readily seen; open to view; visible. 2. Readily 
understood or perceived; plain or obvious." From Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 54 (1977): "1: open to view: VISIBLE 2: clear 
or manifest to the understanding 3: appearing as actual to the 
eye or mind * * * * • • From Black's Law Dictionary 96 (Sixth 
Edition 1990) (emphasis added): "That which is obvious, evident, 
or manifest; what appears, or has been made manifest. That which 
appears to the eye or mind; open to view; plain, patent." 
Taking into account these standard definitions, the term 
"apparent" should be construed to mean "conduct having the 
appearance of". Thus the intended meaning of the provision would 
be "in an act having the appearance of sexual stimulation or 
gratification". 
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Utah Code § 76-10-1201 (included in the Appellant's Addendum 
A) should be also noted for its impact on the meaning of the term 
"apparent" in the City ordinance. That section refers to "an act 
of apparent or actual sexual stimulation or gratification." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (Utah 1977). The use in the state code 
provision of the term "apparent or actual" reinforces the point 
that this refers to the conduct itself and not the state of mind 
of the offender. 
The defendant has not fully briefed the issue, having failed 
to present argument in support of the proposition that the phrase 
"in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is 
actually an element of intent. On that basis, the plaintiff 
requests that the Court of Appeals decline to the consider the 
issue framed by the defendant. 
Further, the plain language of the ordinance does not support 
the asserted interpretation of the defendant. Therefore, "intent 
to obtain" sexual stimulation or gratification is not an element 
of the offense. The operative element of intent was "willfully", 
and under that standard the evidence was sufficient for the trial 
court to conclude that the defendant had willfully engaged in "an 
act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification". As the 
trial judge indicated: "When you look at the circumstances of the 
whole, you have [the defendant] in the car sitting next to the 
officer [with her] hand cuffed over [her] bare breast at the same 
time fondling his genitals." R. 84. 
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POINT IV, 
The evidence was sufficient to prove "in an act of 
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" as an 
element of the ordinance which did not modify intent. 
The defendant provides no alternative argument or analysis in 
the event the Court of Appeals were to decide the phrase was not 
an element of intent or to refuse to consider the issue. The City 
would again request the Court of Appeals to refuse to consider the 
issue for the defendant's failure to fully brief the issue. 
Irrespective of the above, the evidence was sufficient to 
prove "an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification". 
In considering the testimony presented as evidence, the trial 
judge found that the police officer's testimony was more credible. 
R. 82. And the trial court found that, looking at "the 
circumstances of the whole, you have [the defendant] in the car 
sitting next to the officer [her] hand cuffed over her bare breast 
at the same time fondling his genitals." R.84. The "circumstances 
of the whole" included testimony that the officer identified the 
defendant as an individual with prior prostitution bookings (R. 
67), in an area of known prostitution activity (R. 66), and that 
the "are you dating" exchange and associated exposure of body 
parts was a known component of the prostitution business (R. 68, 
72) . 
The evidence in this case was sufficient. The "clearly 
erroneous" standard applies to appellate review of appeals from 
bench trials claiming insufficiency of the evidence. State v. 
Featherstone, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). Only where the trial 
court's findings are " 'against the clear weight of the evidence, 
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or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made' " will an appellate court 
set aside the findings or verdict. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 431-
32 (citation omitted). Further, an appellate court "must give due 
regard to the opportunity of the 'trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witness.' " Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 432 
(citation omitted). 
The contextual background developed through the testimony at 
trial provides support for the verdict that the defendant 
committed "an act of apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification". Further, the testimony indicated that the 
defendant raised her own blouse and bra, covered her breast, and 
indicated she would expose herself to the officer. R. 68. It is a 
reasonable inference and conclusion that an individual with one 
hand over her naked breast and reaching over and groping someone's 
crotch with the free hand can be considered to have committed an 
act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. And it is 
that inference and conclusion that the trial court reached. R. 84. 
The evidence was more than sufficient in this case to prove 
"an act of sexual stimulation or gratification". The trial 
court's findings do not go against the clear weight of the 
evidence, and no mistake was made. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 431-
32. 
Considering all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, the evidence at trial was sufficient to uphold the 
verdict, where the phrase "in an act of sexual stimulation or 
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gratification" does not modify the element of intent. State v. 
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 1992). 
POINT V, 
Even if "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" 
were to be considered an element of intent, the evidence 
was sufficient to uphold the conviction. 
The City submits the following argument in the alternative in 
light of the City's position that this argument has not been 
preserved for appeal nor marshaled appropriately on appeal, and 
that the phrase is not an element of intent. Even if "apparent 
sexual stimulation or gratification" were to be considered an 
element of intent, the evidence was sufficient to uphold the 
conviction. 
If "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" was to be 
considered an element of intent, defendant has misstated the 
logical construction of the phrase as an element of intent. The 
term "obtain" set forth in the defendant's statement of the issue 
is nowhere to be found in the ordinance or statute. It has been 
provided by the defendant. The term"obtain" implies the attempt 
by the defendant to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification for 
herself. The term "provide" would be just as reasonable an 
addition. Restating the defendant's statement of the issue: Was 
the evidence insufficient to prove the defendant's actions were 
done with the intent to obtain and/or provide sexual gratification 
or stimulation for oneself or to another? 
Under this reasonable construction, the issue becomes whether 
the conduct was done in an attempt to provide sexual stimulation 
or gratification to a person other than the defendant. In this 
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instance, that other person would be the undercover police 
officer, perceived by the defendant to be a potential customer. 
The sexual stimulation or gratification intended by the defendant 
here would have been that of the potential customer, not herself. 
The defendant acknowledges that "[a] defendant's intent is 
not easy to prove and there is rarely any direct evidence of 
intent. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980)." 
Appellant's Brief at 5. The defendant asserts that "the best way 
to prove intent is by looking at what the defendant did and what 
she said. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Canfield, 422 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1967)." Appellant's Brief at 
5-6. The trial court did exactly that. In considering the 
testimony presented as evidence, the trial judge found that the 
police officer's testimony was more credible. R. 82. The trial 
court found that, looking at "the circumstances of the whole, you 
have [the defendant] in the car sitting next to the officer [her] 
hand cuffed over her bare breast at the same time fondling his 
genitals." R.84. State v. Kennedy. 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980), and 
State v. Coolev. 603 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979) are cited without 
analysis. Appellant's Brief at 6. The City and the Court are left 
to speculate how these address the issue. 
The defendant asserts that her statement when groping him 
"You're not even unzipped yet." somehow proves that there was no 
attempt at sexual stimulation or gratification. R. 68, Appellant's 
4 
Brief at 6. Such an assertion ignores the context of the 
situation developed through testimony. The City submits that in 
the context of the situation, preliminary negotiations for a sex 
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act, all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom are 
sufficient to uphold the verdict. It is a reasonable inference 
under the evidence that the defendant engaged in an act of 
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification in an attempt to 
speed up the negotiation process or to encourage the conclusion of 
a deal. 
The evidence was more than sufficient in this case to prove 
"an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" even if 
the phrase "in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification" modified the element of intent.. The trial court's 
findings do not go against the clear weight of the evidence, and 
no mistake was made. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 431-32. 
Considering all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, the evidence at trial was sufficient to uphold the 
verdict, even if the phrase "in an act of sexual stimulation or 
gratification" modified the element of intent. State v. Lemons, 
844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant failed to direct the trial court's attention to 
the specific issue now before the Court of Appeals. Where a 
defendant fails to provide a trial court with the opportunity to 
fully address the issue, the defendant is deemed to have waived 
the issue for purposes of appeal. 
The defendant has failed to marshal all the evidence in favor 
of the verdict, and show how, considering that evidence in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence fails to support the 
verdict. Where a defendant fails to properly marshal the 
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evidence, the Court of Appeals is under no obligation to further 
review the defendant's claims. 
There has been no analysis beyond mere assertion that the "in 
an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" element of 
the offense is an element of intent. The plain language of the 
statute indicates that the phrase is not an element of intent. 
The defendant again suggests that, if not an element of intent, 
the phrase is nonetheless an element. However, the defendant 
again provides no argument or analysis. Where there is no 
argument of an asserted issue, the Court of Appeals may properly 
refuse to consider the issue. 
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the requirement 
of "in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" 
regardless of whether the phrase was considered an element of 
intent or an element of physical activity. 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff and Appellee Salt Lake 
City respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the 
defendant * s conviction. 
SUBMITTED this l^ Jffyy day of August, 1995. 
T A." FISHER^ 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDA 
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unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a 
whole clearly nega tes the presumed fact; 
(2) In submi t t ing the issue of the existence of a 
presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge 
t ha t while the presumed fact must on all evi-
dence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
law regards the facts giving rise to the presump-
tion as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by de-
fendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by 
this code or other statutes shall be presented by the 
defendant. 1*73 
PART 6 
DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms ap-
ply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal re-
sponsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, ill-
ness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capa-
ble of causing death or serious bodily injury, or a 
facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to reason-
ably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal 
statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when 
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capa-
ble of acting. 
(8) "Person" -means an individual, public or 
private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical posses-
sion of or to exercise dominion or control over 
tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily in-
jury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 1969 
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PART 1 
CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct 
and criminal responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct 
is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, reck-
lessly, with criminal negligence, or with a men-
tal state otherwise specified in the statute defin-
ing the offense, as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not 
apply to the violations set forth in Title 41 , Chapter 
6, unless specifically provided by law. 1983 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — 
* Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall re-
quire a culpable mental state, and when the defini-
tion of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to es-
tablish criminal responsibility. An offense shall in-
volve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose crim-
inal responsibility for commission of the conduct pro-
hibited by the statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state. 1983 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with 
intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or 
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or mali-
ciously"; and "criminal negligence or 
criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with re-
spect to his conduct or to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circum-
stances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowl-
edge, with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the re-
sult of his conduct when he is aware of but con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the circumstances exist or the re-
sult will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordi-
nary person would exercise under all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care tha t an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 1974 
76-2-104. Conduct — When defined as offense. 
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it with 
criminal negligence. Conduct is also an offense if a 
person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages 
in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a 
person engages in it intentionally or knowingly. Con-
duct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly, 
the conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it 
intentionally. 1973 
PART 2 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER 
76-2-201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1» "Agent" means any director, officer, em-
ployee, or other person authorized to act in behalf 
of a corporation or association. 
(2) "High managerial agent" means: 
(a) A partner in a partnership; 
lb) An officer of a corporation or associa-
tion; 
(c) An agent of a corporation or associa-
tion who has duties of such responsibility 
that his conduct reasonably may be assumed 
to represent the policy of the corporation or 
association. 
(3» "Corporation" means all organizations re-
quired by the laws of this state or any other state 
to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of 
incorporation, or other form of registration to 
transact business as a corporation within this 
state or any other state and shall include domes-
tic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but 
shall not include a corporation sole, as such term 
is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of 
authority, incorporation, or other form of regis-
tration shall be no defense when such organiza-
tion conducted its business in a manner as to 
appear to have lawful corporate existence. 1973 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct com-
mission of offense or for conduct of an-
other. 
Every person, acting with the mental state re-
quired for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, com-
mands, encourages, or intentionally aids another per-
son to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
1973 
76-2-203. Defenses unavailable in prosecution 
based on conduct of another. 
In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal re-
sponsibility is based on the conduct of another, it is 
no defense: 
(1) That the actor belongs to a class of persons 
who by definition of the offense is legally incapa-
ble of committing the offense in an individual 
capacity, or 
(2) That the person for whose conduct the actor 
is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has 
not been prosecuted or convicted, has been con-
victed of a different offense or of a different type 
or class of offense or is immune from prosecution. 
1973 
76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation 
or association. 
A corporation or association is guilty of an offense 
when: 
(1) The conduct constituting the offense con-
sists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of 
affirmative performance imposed on corporations 
or associations by law; or 
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is au-
thorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or un-
dertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by 
the board of directors or by a high managerial 
agent acting within the scope of his employment 
and in behalf of the corporation or association. 
1973 
76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for 
conduct in name of corporation or as-
sociation. 
A person is criminally liable for conduct consti-
tuting an offense which he performs or causes to be 
